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INTRODUCTION
The idea of upward mobility—that anyone who works hard, obeys the
law, and saves his money can get ahead—is deeply engrained.  From Horatio
Alger stories to current Hollywood productions and TV programs, America
pays homage to the tale of the hard working, upward striving youth who starts
out poor but overcomes obstacles, opens a business, invents a machine,
marries well, and ends up in a social class many stations higher than the one
in which he or she began.1
Yet, studies have consistently shown that Americans enjoy much less
upward (and more downward) mobility than is commonly believed.  Most
children of poor families remain so all their lives, and very few of those who
start out in the lowest economic strata wind up at the top.  Wealthy dynasties
endure forever, while children born to middle-class parents rarely advance
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Society”).  On the worsening distribution of income and wealth, stagnant real wages, and the tenuousness
of middle-class status, see Juliet Schor, As Public Goods Decay and Democracy Wanes, the Populace is
Offered SUVs, Malls, and Debts, BOSTON REV., Sept./Oct. 2005 [hereinafter Democracy Wanes].
3. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 16, 23, 183, 186-90 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part IIA (discussing MICHAEL GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS:
THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005) [hereinafter DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS].  See also
DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS at 6-7, 118-20 (noting that may Americans expect, unrealistically, to die
rich).
6. See text and notes 18-19, infra; DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS, supra note 5, at 6-7, 118-20
(noting that many Americans expect to die rich).
7. See DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS, supra note 5.
much beyond the bounds of that class any time during their lives.  Despite its
self image as an entrepreneurial, upward-striving society, the United States
exhibits the least upward mobility of any Western industrialized society,
including the ostensibly classless, highly taxed nations of Europe and
Scandinavia.2
If the narrative of upward mobility is largely untrue, why does it exert
such a hold on our imagination?  We subscribe to it, perhaps, because, like all
romantic stories, it corresponds to our deepest aspirations.  We like to think
of ourselves as an open, freedom-loving society where one rises or falls on the
basis of one’s merits and social contribution.
But the ideal also serves a number of less attractive purposes.  It enables
those of us who are comfortable to ignore the predicament of the poor.  We
can tell ourselves that, they too, could rise if they would only go to school,
work hard, save their money, tend to their families, and stay out of trouble.3
It enables freemarket theorists to reason that the poor have no one but
themselves to blame and that catering to them weakens their will to achieve.4
The myth gulls ordinary citizens like those who voted for repeal of the estate
tax in the belief that they would die rich and wanted to pass their estates on to
their children intact.   And it discourages class consciousness among the5
working poor, many of whom harbor the unrealistic belief that they will one
day be rich—win the lottery, be discovered by a Hollywood talent scout, cut
a hit record, or make a fortune from an invention, song, or book—and so need
not expend effort forging solidarity with other members of their class, whom
they regard as losers.   If one is somewhere only temporarily, why bother to6
get to know the locals?
Two recent books offer contrasting perspectives on mobility in our
society.  In Death by a Thousand Cuts:  The Fight over Taxing Inherited
Wealth,  Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro show how conservatives persuaded7
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8. CHARLES MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS:  A PLAN TO REPLACE THE WELFARE STATE (2006).
9. See infra Part IIB (discussing Murray’s book and plan in further detail).
10. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
most of the American public to repeal the nearly 100-year-old estate tax in
2001.  Enacted with broad bipartisan support, the repeal is scheduled to take
effect a decade after its passage and came about as a result of a years-long
grassroots campaign by right-wing and libertarian think tanks.  Its backers
billed it as a populist effort to promote the work ethic and American dream.
In reality, abolition of the tax will benefit only a handful of very wealthy
individuals and be a step toward eliminating progressive taxation, protecting
vestiges of aristocratic privilege, and shrinking the role of government.  Graetz
and Shapiro show how the repeal happened and argue that it will make
America much more unequal than it is now.
Charles Murray’s In our Hands:  A Plan to Replace the Welfare State  is8
a proposal to do away with more than a trillion dollars of welfare transfer
programs at the federal, state, and local levels and substitute instead an annual
cash grant to every adult.  For Murray the welfare state induces dependency
and strips life of meaning, consequences, and initiative.  Providing everyone
with an annual stipend to use as they wish avoids these risks while revitalizing
the family, vocation, and community.  It can make government smaller while
strengthening institutions such as churches, families, and small businesses.9
These two books, one by a pair of progressive scholars, the other by the
conservative author of The Bell Curve and Losing Ground, represent
diametrically opposite approaches to the politics of social justice.  One argues
for more government participation, the other for less.  One demarcates a large
role for the state in redistributing wealth, the other for a much smaller one.
One corresponds, roughly, to Democratic ambitions and harkens back to the
New Deal, Brown v. Board of Education,  the Great Society, and the Sixties.10
The other corresponds to Republican programs including federalism, judicial
quietism, supply-side economics, original intent, and the Contract with
America.  Deciding which course is best for a country like ours is a vital task,
with welfare policy and tax reform as key ingredients in that challenge.
As will be seen, right-leaning authors like Murray assume that our society
is relatively open and that, with a little seed money, anyone who works hard
can succeed.  By contrast, liberals hold that immigrants, minorities, and
children often need a helping hand so that they can reach their potential.  And
for them, a key way to fund vital programs is by means of a progressive
income tax.
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as one of four constitutive American narratives, or tales, that of the upward striving youth who overcomes
obstacles and achieves success).  See also Richard Delgado, Inequality from the Top:  Applying an Ancient
Prohibition to an Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32 UCLA L. REV. 100 (1984); DEATH BY A
THOUSAND CUTS, supra note 5, at 8 (pointing out that the general public—as well as a few “robber barons”
such as Andrew Carnegie—in the early twentieth century supported enactment of the estate tax out of
dislike of an “economic aristocracy of self-perpetuating elites”); text and notes 26-27, 214-17 infra (noting
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15. For example, blacks, who were enslaved; Indians, who were removed from their ancestral homes
and exterminated; and Japanese-Americans, who suffered internment during WW II.
16. See infra Part III (“Upward Mobility in American Society”).  See also Paul Krugman, Losing
Our Country, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at A23 (middle-class status is increasingly insecure for most
This Essay begins by surveying the myth of upward mobility and the part
it plays in popular culture.   Next, it discusses the two books mentioned11
above, showing how they rest on contrasting views about human agency and
the possibility of rapid social advance.   It then reviews social science studies12
of the extent of social mobility in the United States and shows how the legal
system has helped construct its own version of it.   A brief conclusion13
proposes a new narrative of working-class solidarity to replace the myth of
upward mobility.
I.  UPWARD STRIVING IN MYTH AND NARRATIVE
Upward striving and social mobility are deeply inscribed in American
folklore.  From the first religious settlers, to historical figures such as
Benjamin Franklin, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln, to Fourth of July
speeches, to treasured documents such as the Declaration of Independence, to
the waves of immigrants who passed through Ellis Island, we celebrate the
self-made individual who rose high through her own efforts.  This American
Dream, as well as the stock stories we tell to reassure ourselves that it is still
alive, teach that if one works hard enough, one will advance steadily toward
a life of greater security, affluence, and fulfillment.14
While the dream did ring true during certain periods of history, it has
never been a reality for the entire population.  Society excluded many groups
from the opportunity to share in that dream,  and, even today, the much-15
vaunted middle class has begun to stagnate and shrink.   Most Americans are16
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§ 3 (Sunday Business), at 1, 7 (describing deteriorating living standards, including life expectancy, public
services, infant mortality, obesity, and job security for many Americans); Schor, Democracy Wanes, supra
note 2.
17. See Peter Edelman, Where Race Meets Class:  The 21st Century Civil Rights Agenda, 12 GEO.
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American explanation—‘it’s their own fault.  Horatio Alger’s heroes made it, why didn’t they?’”)
[hereinafter Edelman, Race Meets Class].
18. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM:  RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL
OF THE NATION 72-73 (1996); see also JIM CULLEN, THE AMERICAN DREAM:  A SHORT HISTORY OF AN
IDEA THAT SHAPED A NATION 6 (2003) [hereinafter CULLEN, DREAM].
19. Blacks overall enjoy some of the least upward mobility of any group, with even the achievement
of middle-class status insecure.  See Edelman, Race Meets Class, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that median
income of young African-American families dropped 48% between 1973 and 1990 and that “Things
continued to get worse.”  Id.).  Black families have, on average, little savings, see MELVIN L. OLIVER &
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH:  A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY
(1995), so that many find themselves living from payday to payday, depending on two or more incomes to
make ends meet, and maintaining high levels of credit card debt.  A relative’s arrest or loss of a single job
in a two-earner family can send a family into a downward spiral from which it may never recover.  When
that downward spiral starts, pawnbrokers, loan sharks, and predatory lenders, ever present in minority
neighborhoods, are quick to take advantage of the family’s vulnerability.
20. See CULLEN, DREAM, supra note 18, at 40, 47-48, 57.
ignorant of how the myth of upward mobility enables the wealthy to justify
favorable treatment for themselves and cutbacks for the rest.  It also fuels
rhetoric holding that it is not the responsibility of the government to maintain
a social safety net, that any failures are our own fault and any rewards the
products of our own individual efforts.17
Political scientist Jennifer Hochschild compiles data in her 1996 book,
Facing Up to the American Dream  that suggest that working-class black18
Americans believe in the myth of upward mobility with an intensity that
baffles more affluent African Americans, who see it as an opiate that blinds
their lower-achieving counterparts to structural barriers that prevent collective
action.   In similar fashion, historian Jim Cullen exposes how the American19
Dream has served to justify the extermination of Native Americans and the
enslavement of Africans.20
Civics-class versions of American history include well-known figures
who embody the self-made man motif.  Even though a vast majority of recent
presidents and politicians have come from wealthy backgrounds, we celebrate
Andrew Jackson and Harry Truman, who did not, and Abraham Lincoln who
studied by the light of an oil lamp on his way to a life in law and politics.
Even transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson believed that the simple
884 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:879
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the electric chair.  See also Curtis Sittenfeld, Prep (2005), describing a blue-collar child smoldering with
class resentment at a fancy private school); SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (1923) (telling a
similar story of greed-fueled upward striving).
24. See Frank Rich, When You Got It, Flaunt It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at 1.
25. See CULLEN, DREAM, supra note 18, at 177; McGrath, In Fiction, supra note 23, at E4
(describing role of reality TV in shaping the aspirations of middle-class viewers).
application of effort could make one the master of one’s fate.   Of course,21
during much of our history, Native Americans, blacks, women, and most
working class people were missing from the upward mobility mystique, and
stories rarely celebrated their triumphs, particularly when they took the form
of resistance to the governing order.22
Alongside our selectively-framed history has developed a popular
literature celebrating upward mobility.  Horatio Alger stories and tales such
as that of Dick Whittington and His Cat focus on good and righteous people
who work hard, embrace the Protestant ethic, and earn their just rewards.23
Many wealthy members of society play up this aspect of their histories,
ignoring the parts that luck, a well-connected friend, or an inheritance played
in their rise.  In our time, Martha Stewart and Bill O’Reilly, wealthy TV
figures and entertainers, have spotlighted their humble roots—embellished
considerably—in an attempt to connect with their audiences and inspire others
with their rags-to-riches stories.24
Even reality television shows reinforce the idea that ordinary people can
achieve sudden wealth so long as they have the “right stuff.”  Shows such as
“Survivor” and “American Idol” reward the hard-working and talented.  In
similar fashion, “The Apprentice” teaches that one does not need an
impressive Ivy League education, or even any special training, to succeed in
business; all one needs is a winning personality, confident demeanor, and the
willingness to take chances.   One may be struggling, behind on one’s credit25
card payments, and with no idea of how to finance one’s children’s education
or one’s own retirement.  But if one maintains a happy face, keeps the faith,
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29. See infra Part IV (“The Official Construction of Upward Mobility”).
30. Cited in full supra note 5.
and perseveres, one’s ship will come in.   For African Americans, Jet and26
Ebony magazines perform a similar function, covering the opulent living
styles of black entertainers and executives who have made it big with photo
spreads of their cars, hair stylists, mansions, and animal rugs.27
Another trend among reality television shows targets a timely anxiety:
the middle class’s fear of falling.  Shows such as “Extreme Makeover:  Home
Edition” and “The Scholar” give away a house, a college scholarship, health
care, or cosmetic surgery, all foundations of upward mobility.  The recipients
of these bounties come across as having faith, being positive, and as refusing
to blame others for their predicament.  Their hardships are the product of fate,
not cutbacks in social programs or changes in national priorities.  The
solutions to their problems are entirely individual, private, and local; the
programs scrupulously avoid mentioning any need for a national collective
effort.  They teach that if we live by the tenets of the Protestant ethic—work
hard, do not grumble, and pray—we will find our miracles, too.   This reading28
of the American Dream reinforces the idea that upward mobility is entirely an
individual effort and that neither the government should help us nor are the
wealthy to be blamed for our failures.
It is not only popular culture and civics-class history that teach the myth
of upward mobility.  As we shall see, legislatures and courts play a part as
well.   First, however, let us examine two recent books dealing with upward29
mobility and the government’s role in advancing it.
II.  RECENT BOOKS ON SPENDING POLICY AND UPWARD MOBILITY
Two recent books illustrate contrasting approaches to upward mobility
and the state’s role in safeguarding it.  Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro’s
Death by a Thousand Cuts:  The Fight over Taxing Inherited Wealth  tells the30
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31. Id. at 14-15, 74-85, 123-25, 229, 232, 235, 253-55.
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34. Id. at 7-10, 12-23, 42-43, 74-75, 78, 80-81, 130, 140-41, 213-14.
35. See MURRAY, supra note 8.
36. Id. at 1, 8-14.
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38. Id. at 5-6.
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 6.
story of the recent repeal of the estate tax.  Graetz and Shapiro show how
conservative operatives played upon the public’s fears of a “death tax” that
would deprive them of the right to pass their estates on to their children when
they died.   Of course, the estate tax only targeted the wealthiest sector of the31
population.   But Republican boosters, abetted by some middle-class and32
African American confederates, succeeded in persuading a majority of
Americans that the estate tax was unfair to persons like them,  as well as33
immoral.34
Charles Murray’s In Our Hands:  A Plan to Replace the Welfare State35
urges the abolition of over one trillion dollars of welfare transfer payments in
favor of a ten-thousand-dollar-a-year grant to every American over the age of
21.   Both books are, in their way, excellent:  Graetz and Shapiro’s a careful36
and scholarly dissection of a long-building conservative campaign, Murray’s
an audacious plan to transform how this nation approaches social support of
the needy.
A.  Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts:  The Fight
Over Taxing Inherited Wealth
The estate tax is relatively simple in concept.  As Graetz and Shapiro
explain, when a very wealthy person dies in this country, his or her estate pays
a portion of the value of its assets to the government before the remainder
passes on to the children or other heirs.   The tax is subject to a number of37
exemptions.  If the estate passes to a spouse, no tax is owed until that person
dies.   The same is true if the person leaves money to a charity or sets up a38
charitable foundation.   Until the enactment of the 2001 tax bill, only39
individuals with assets of more than $650,000 or married couples with assets
of more than $1.3 million were subject to the tax.40
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45. David Runciman, Tax Breaks for Rich Murderers, LONDON REV. BOOKS, June 2005, at 27
[hereinafter Runciman, Rich Murderers].
46. DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS, supra note 5, at 7-10, 12-23, 42-43, 74-75, 78, 80-81, 130.
47. Id. at 239-57.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 9-31.
In 1999, only 2.3 percent of all estates paid any estate tax at all, and the
average size of those taxed was $2.5 million.   The average tax bill for those41
estates was $460,000, or just under 19 percent.   The amount of taxes that the42
government collected in this fashion was $24.4 billion, an amount that would
fund nearly one-half of the operating budget of the Department of Homeland
Security or Department of Education, and twice the amount of annual Pell
grants for higher education.   Of the total proceeds, more than half came from43
the richest 7 percent of taxable estates, those valued at $5 million or more,
corresponding to the wealthiest 0.1 percent of our society.  Nearly one-fourth
of the total revenues, $5.7 billion, came from 550 estates with $20 million or
more.  And nearly two-thirds of the wealth taxed took the form of securities
and other liquid assets, not family businesses or farms.   The estate tax was44
the most progressive part of the American tax system because it rested on the
idea that the wealthiest members of society, if they did not choose to leave
their money to charity, should not be allowed to pass it all on untouched to
their heirs.45
With these realities in mind, how did the pro-repeal forces manage to turn
their campaign into a popular crusade?  Graetz and Shapiro show how they
successfully deployed a combination of strategies:  Patiently gathering groups
to the cause over time, preventing splits within the coalition, waging a single-
issue campaign against the “death tax” in isolation from broader social
concerns, and winning the moral-philosophical argument.   They also raised46
a great deal of money from wealthy backers.   The opposition’s inability to47
marshal a timely response furthered the gathering momentum for repeal.48
The impetus for repeal came not from corporations or the halls of power
but from the ground up.  Central to the task was the work of a small number
of true believers who devoted years of their lives to it, working patiently and
behind the scenes.   To prevail, they had to gain the support of nontraditional49
groups, such as first-generation minority business owners who might be
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vulnerable to the tax.   They also targeted the gay and lesbian community.50
Since gays and lesbians are not entitled to the “marital exemption,” the tax
comes due immediately upon the death of a partner and again at the time of
the second partner’s death.  Thus gays were taxed twice, which newly-
solicitous Republicans condemned as a form of discrimination.   Ready to51
play the race card when it suited them, the conservative backers also promoted
repeal among the black community on the ground that it penalized black
businessmen who had successfully battled prejudice all their lives and hit
them with a hefty tax just as they prepared to pass their hard-won earnings on
to their children.52
The most formidable challenge for the repeal movement was the
American middle class.   Most of these citizens stood to gain little by repeal53
and to lose a great deal.   Repealing the tax would relieve only the richest54
members of the public from the burden of paying taxes, while not benefiting
the average citizen at all.  Indeed, by reducing the tax dollars available for
programs such as aid to college students, Homeland Security, Social Security,
Medicare, medical and scientific research, and the national highway and park
systems, repeal made life more difficult for a large majority of Americans.
How did the sponsors pull this off?  They employed a number of
strategies, some duplicitous, others perfectly legitimate.  One was to separate
the campaign against the estate tax from association with other causes, such
as weakening environmental protections, gutting affirmative action, opposing
gay marriage and child care, and increasing military spending, dear to most
conservatives.   By doing so, repeal advocates were able to bring many55
liberals into the fold and induce them to support a cause that would do little
for most of them and further undermine the progressive agenda.   Evidence56
of how successful these proponents were is that several members of the
Congressional Black Caucus did, in fact, vote for repeal.57
The pro-repeal camp also managed to portray the estate tax as targeting
not just the idle but the working rich, who became the poster children of the
movement and garnered even more public support.   By presenting horror58
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stories of small business owners or farmers faced with heavy penalties under
the current scheme, proponents tapped into the public’s Horatio Alger
sympathies.   If one started a business, the argument went, worked the long59
hours necessary to make it successful, earned money from and paid taxes on
it, why should the government collect taxes from you a second time when you
die?60
Repeal boosters pointed out that the assets of these small businesses and
farms were seldom liquid, but rather lay in the value of their equipment, crops,
good will, and inventory, so that unless the decedent paid attention to estate
planning and tax avoidance, enough liquid assets would not be on hand to
cover the tax bill and the family would lose the farm or business.   The story61
emerged of a spirit of entrepreneurship crushed when family farms and
businesses could not be passed on to the heirs because of the greed and
irrationality of the tax code.  Boosters also argued that the forced sale of a
family business hurt local economies, cost many jobs, and even injured the
environment.62
The pro-repeal camp even managed to persuade a number of minority
groups to sign on, by proclaiming that the “death tax” amounted to yet another
form of discrimination.  Only since the 1960’s, they pointed out, have African
Americans and other minorities begun to accumulate real wealth.   Yet the63
“legacy killer” aimed to tax away the money that minorities worked so hard
for, leaving them little to pass on to their heirs.   By contrast, white people,64
who have been able to accumulate wealth over generations, would be less
severely affected.   By 2001, the pro-repeal movement had not only gained65
the support of many African Americans but that of the National Association
of Women Business Owners, the National Indian Business Association, the
U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and the U.S. Pan Asian American
Chamber of Commerce.66
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69. Id. at 6.
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73. See Runciman, Rich Murderers, supra note 45, noting how some advocates of repeal conjured
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Repeal proponents were not above embellishing the facts, for example by
bringing Chester Thigpen, an African American owner of a tree farm in
Mississippi, to testify before Congress.   Thigpen’s tale of woe turned out to67
be untrue; his son, Roy, later revealed that Thigpen’s estate was not taxable
because the value of its assets fell well below the threshold where the tax
applies, and that his speech to Congress had been written by “some
professors.”   This systematic campaign of misinformation carried out68
through the 1990’s contributed to a groundswell of popular support.  One poll
showed that 77 percent of the population believed—incorrectly—that the
estate tax affected all Americans.   More than one-third believed that they69
themselves would have to pay the tax, either because they misunderstood its
nature or believed that they would somehow die rich.   Some middle-class70
families with few savings thought that, by voting for repeal, they were helping
their children get a good start in life.71
By deeming the inheritance tax the “death tax” and attaching it to specific
families and individuals such as Chester Thigpen and his tree farm, pro-
repealers misled the public and preyed upon their greed.  They also won the
moral argument when they argued, falsely but with little opposition, that the
tax only helps fancy lawyers, expensive tax accountants, and the insurance
industry  and burdens families at exactly the wrong time:  upon the death of72
a relative.73
They also won the moral argument by standing a commonsense argument
on its head.  Tax policies that exact heavy tolls on productive activity are not
efficient; they deter that activity to some extent.  But not taxing is unfair.
One’s heirs, usually children who have done nothing to generate the wealth
and may be lazy louts, get to lead lives of leisure, while others, much more
deserving, may go without.  Progressive taxation tries to strike a balance,
taxing different types of income with an eye to accomplishing a reasonable
amount of social distribution without deterring production too drastically.
That is the main reason why the estate tax lasted close to 100 years—it did
2007] THE MYTH OF UPWARD MOBILITY 891
74. Id.
75. Thigpen is the African-American farmer mentioned immediately above.  See also id. at 41
(mentioning the case of Representative Jennifer Dunn, a single mother who raised two boys alone).
76. E.g., id. at 255.  Repeal zealots failed to mention that we do this all the time.  For example, the
same person can have to pay income, consumption, capital gains, and gift tax—all on the same money.
77. Runciman, Rich Murderers, supra note 45, quoting anti-tax advocate Grover Norquist.  See also
id. at 140-41, 213-14 (same), 236 (noting that some Americans actually found this argument credible).
78. DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS, supra note 5, at 85-98.
79. Id. at 19-20, 120-30, 254-55.
80. Id. at 99-106, 259-65.
81. Id. at 34-40, 45-47, 134, 216, 259-60.
relatively little to discourage wealth-generation, while providing concrete
benefits for the rest of society.  It was both efficient and fair.74
But the opposition turned this around.  In addition to criticizing the estate
tax as inefficient and prone to stifle wealth creation, they also attacked it as
unfair.  They renamed it the “death tax,” with all the ghoulish overtones that
the rechristened name evoked.  They also characterized it as a burden on the
person seeking to pass on his wealth toward the end of his life—like Chester
Thigpen —rather than one placed on those who stood to inherit it, usually his75
children.  And they portrayed the tax as unfair because it taxed income
twice—once when you earn it, and later again when you die.   One supporter76
even likened it to the Holocaust, because it only targeted a small percentage
of the population, and if you begin by looting one group, who knows where
that will lead?77
Graetz and Shapiro examine the ever-widening circle of conservative
think tanks, particularly the Heritage Foundation, that blurred the line between
advocacy and public education by aligning with the forces of repeal.   By78
isolating the estate tax from other issues, think tankers were able to present
skewed polls suggesting that the tax was unpopular with a majority of
Americans.  These polls’ results proved influential in persuading members of
Congress that an irresistible tide was flowing against the estate tax.79
Against this formidable array of stories, anecdotes, and statistics, all
backed by big money, opponents such as the Democratic Party, the insurance
industry, labor unions, and charities entered the fray with too little, too late.80
The best the Democrats could do was a lethally complex alternative, the
Qualified Family-Owned Business Interests (QFOBI) tax reform provision
that exempted the first $1.2 million of a business’s assets.  Overly complicated
and strict, the plan proved a complete failure.   Thus, when the Democrats81
offered better reform alternatives after George W. Bush came into office, they
proved unable to dent the pro-repeal coalition—even though small businesses
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and farmers could have benefited more from reform than from the repeal bill
that passed.  Everyone was too afraid of another QFOBI.82
For their part, charities and other non-profit organizations could not come
out against repeal, since many of their board members were wealthy and stood
to lose if repeal failed.   The insurance industry proved similarly hamstrung.83
That industry benefits when business owners and farmers buy insurance to pay
the estate tax, but it, too, suffered from internal conflicts.  A Republican-
dominated industry, it hesitated to cast its lot with an opposition composed
largely of Democrats and populist reformers like Ralph Nader.  Moreover, it
feared that any opposition to the repeal movement might strike the public as
simple nest-feathering.84
Organized labor sat the campaign out for a different reason.  Although tax
repeal stood to hurt a huge majority of unionists, their movement was beset
with more serious problems, including the collapse of collective bargaining,
trade policy, and holding the line against union-busting tactics and
downsizing, and so could mount little serious resistance (pp. 107-12).
With the odds increasingly on the side of repeal, it was easy to gain
access to Congress and President Bush.  Graetz and Shapiro thus devote most
of an entire section (“The Battle for Passage,” pp. 131-218; see also pp. 41-49)
to legislative events leading up to repeal in 2001.  The reader with any
illusions about the rectitude or transparency of the legislative process will
come away chastened.  This portion of the book is a disturbing look at power
politics in Washington.  With profiles of the movers and shakers, the reader
comes to see clearly how not all Congress people are equal on the Hill and
how much current-day politics resembles a used car lot.
In the end, the pro-repeal movement did not get everything it wanted.
Congress repealed the tax only for people who die between January 1 and
December 31, 2010.  The reform phases out the top rate gradually, so that it
bottoms out in 2009, leaving the estates of most of those who die in the next
year—2010—free from paying any tax at all.  At the same time, the exemption
rises year-by-year beginning in 2001 and will top out at $3.5 million in 2010.
The gift tax (which targets wealthy people who try to give away their estates
in anticipation of their death) remains in place with a $1 million lifetime
exemption.85
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Not entirely satisfied, the movement continues clamoring for permanent
repeal and appears likely to continue to do so in the years remaining before the
2001 provisions sunset.  Moreover, they appear to have their eye on other
provisions of the tax code, as well as on broad-based measures such as the
“fair tax” (national sales tax in lieu of corporate, income, payroll, and estate
tax) and the “flat tax” (a single-rate tax on consumption).86
Graetz and Shapiro conclude with a warning that further efforts are likely
to strike at the very heart of our tax structure:  its progressive nature.   Unless87
ordinary citizens learn how these reforms will damage their interests and
begin to see through the web of narratives that supported the first conservative
breakthrough—repeal of the estate tax—the tax system, designed to offset
some of the wealth inequality in our country, will turn into a weapon to
dramatically increase the wealth gap.   Upward mobility will suffer serious88
erosion—the victim, ironically, of its own narrative—and the tax system will
be dismantled by a thousand cuts.
B.  Charles Murray, A Plan to Replace the Welfare State
Charles Murray’s trademark is intellectual audacity.  His The Bell Curve
(1994)  argues that genetics, not the environment, determines most of a89
person’s mental ability (IQ) and that some races have more of it, on average,
than others.  Moreover, the current distribution of roles in American society
is a product of differing human talents, thus we should not be surprised if most
basketball stars, rocket scientists, and agricultural workers are of different
hues.
Losing Ground (1984)  is a sustained attack on the welfare state that90
seeks to demonstrate that our system of support worsens the poor’s
predicament.  By sapping initiative and encouraging dependency, programs
like AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) weaken family bonds
and encourage men to desert the home and women to have more babies than
they can afford.  Over the years, he has addressed other controversial topics,
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such as political correctness on college campuses, crime, and whether women
have less ability at math and science than men.91
In his new book, A Plan to Replace the Welfare State,  Murray revisits92
the subject matter of his first.  Like Losing Ground, the new book grapples
with poverty, race, and the role of government in addressing inequality.  No
progressive reformer, Murray holds that the solution to these problems does
not lie in new programs, better schools, or new forms of welfare.  Instead, like
other supply-side compatriots, he wishes to harness the power of the
marketplace.   By allowing the productive sector to operate with as few93
restrictions as possible and giving individuals an incentive to work and better
themselves, his flat-grant scheme will revitalize the nation.  Capital and
entrepreneurs with ideas will find each other.  A rising tide will lift all boats,
and all sectors of the economy will flourish.
Murray begins by pointing out that America’s population today is richer
than ever before, and that the United States is, at least by certain measures, the
wealthiest nation in the world.   Annually, the state and federal government94
distributes more than one trillion dollars of that wealth to alleviate sickness,
unemployment, poverty, and other social ills.   Yet, many Americans still lack95
health insurance, while stubborn unemployment and under-employment haunt
our cities.   Even the middle class are insecure about their retirement and96
worry about the viability of the Social Security System.97
Since the government has been spending its money so ineffectually,
Murray proposes that it stop trying and instead give the money to the people
to use as they wish.   This is what he calls “the Plan,” a breathtakingly simple98
proposal that Murray says defies any political label.   (He is quite wrong99
about that:  It is libertarian.)  His Plan would eliminate all welfare transfer
programs—federal, state, and local—including Social Security, Medicare,
Medicaid, HeadStart, and the Earned Income Tax Credit in favor of an annual
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$10,000 cash grant to everyone age 21 or older and not in prison.   It would100
also mean that Congress could not give subsidies to favorite industries, such
as agriculture.   He discusses the advantages of such a plan and how to put101
it into effect.
Separate sections show how the plan would affect current areas of welfare
spending, including health,  retirement,  relief of poverty,  and the102 103 104
family.   Other sections address how reducing the role of government would105
strengthen social bonds and encourage a spirit of entrepreneurship.106
(Inventors, musicians, and artists could use the $10,000-a-year grant as seed
money to set up a new company, band, or art gallery.)  Upward mobility, now
doubly hampered by heavy taxation and welfare-induced dependency, would
soar.
After demonstrating his Plan’s feasibility, Murray goes on to show how
most of the functions of the welfare state—caring for children, protecting the
weak and homeless, assuring a safe retirement for those past their earning
years—would flourish if left to individuals, rather than to the state.   He also107
shows how his approach would strengthen initiative and self-reliance, as
individuals who now look to the government to supply vital services realize
that they can do so better for themselves.108
Just as the Plan would eliminate the need for a large federal bureaucracy,
it would harness the power of the market to drive down the cost of services.
An individual needing medical care, for example, would seek out the doctor
or hospital capable of treating his or her ailment best and at the most
reasonable price.   The resulting competition among caregivers and109
pharmaceutical companies would help contain soaring health care costs.  With
Medicare, for example, patients have no incentive to cut down on hospital
visits or to choose the most efficient form of care; under Murray’s plan, they
would.110
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The last section of his book, entitled “The Larger Purpose,” urges that
Murray’s scheme not only will save the average American money, it can
revitalize America culturally and spiritually.   Citizens will approach life111
with alacrity.  Realizing that their fate lies in their own hands, their decisions
will take on new meaning.  Excitement and individual enterprise will replace
drone-like drudgery and apathetic reliance on outside forces and the
government.   Self-respect will flourish.  By reclaiming their lives from the112
bureaucracies that currently control them, ordinary citizens will discover
resources within themselves.  They will learn to turn to their families,
churches, and neighborhoods for help.  These institutions will grow and
strengthen, and America will become more vibrant.113
Murray even evokes Aristotle (while barely mentioning him) in praise of
his Plan.  By turning to their own resources, citizens will develop compassion,
honesty, and self-reliance.  Aristotle wrote that only through practicing virtue
and making it habitual will one develop a good character.  By learning to do
for ourselves, our children, our families, and our neighbors what the
government currently does for us, America will become a nation of
trustworthy, caring, and socially responsible individuals who not only preach
generosity, prudence, thrift, and foresight, but practice them in their daily
lives.   Seeing others act in this fashion would encourage us to behave114
similarly, since we would realize it was expected.  And as America gradually
turned into a caring community of law-abiding people, we could let down our
guard somewhat.  Some of the energy we now spend building gated
communities and installing burglar alarms would find more productive uses.115
Is Murray serious?  And, is his Plan remotely feasible?  It is a big mistake
to underestimate Charles Murray.  When he wrote Losing Ground in 1984,
critics scoffed.  Yet, it became law in only twelve years with the Welfare
Reform Act of 1996.   Just a few years ago, The Bell Curve with its neo-116
eugenicist tenor struck many readers as repugnant and radical; today, it is well
on its way toward becoming the reigning orthodoxy.117
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Murray clearly does not regard his current book as a mere thought
experiment or debating point,  and his readers should not either.  Even if118
Congress is unlikely to enact it anytime soon, the lesson Graetz and Shapiro’s
book teaches is that conservative ideas often have great staying power.119
Murray’s scheme has solid roots; Milton Friedman proposed something
similar not too long ago, and before him George Stigler,  and think-tank120
conservatives have been talking about it for years.  A proposal like Murray’s
could easily surface in Congress or some bellwether state like California in the
not too distant future.
If so, Murray will have laid much of the groundwork.  Consider how
several sections of his book address the Plan’s practicability and how to put
it into effect.   Others, which discuss likely objections to his scheme, are121
practically a how-to guide for future legislators.  For example, the grant is not
really flat.  Although the vast majority of Americans will qualify for the full
$10,000, above an annual income of $25,000 the grant starts to be taxed, and
at $50,000 recipients stop paying taxes on the grant but the government takes
back the first $5,000.   This compromise with our current scheme of122
progressive income tax avoids the objection that the grant goes to rich people
who would just use it for summer homes, a third car, or a European vacation.
Murray also deals with the possibility that the grant might be a
disincentive to work, particularly for young adults.  Murray takes this
objection seriously, devoting an entire chapter to it.   His main response is123
that people who are currently idle will not become less likely to work by
reason of having $10,000 a year, but more.   He also deals with disincentives124
for high earners making $40,000 a year or more by doubting that they would
react to taxation of their grant by stopping work altogether.  Most individuals
in that bracket find their work so rewarding that they are unlikely to stop
merely because their income level subjects a small part of that income—the
$10,000 of the flat grant—to a tax.125
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Murray also devotes attention to the plan’s cost.  Giving $10,000 to every
American, even coupled with ending most transfer payments, would be more
costly than the current scheme.   But with the escalating costs of such126
programs as Social Security and Medicare, that balance will shift in the near
future.  By the year 2011, Murray’s plan will cost as much as it saves.  After
that, it will start to be much cheaper.  By the year 2020, the Plan would cost
about half a trillion dollars less per year than the current system, by 2028 a
trillion dollars less.127
What about Congress’s weakness for the pork barrel?  Might not
legislators attach a series of strings to the grant, or exempt favorite transfer
programs (such as the subsidy for corn farmers) from abolition?  Murray deals
with that risk by means of a constitutional amendment that, apart from his
cash grant, prohibits the government from engaging in any form of
redistribution—that is, from taking from A to give to B.   The purpose of the128
amendment is effectively to outlaw social programs at every level of
government—federal, state, and local.  Schools, the military, police,
highways, and the legal system would be exempted.129
In the words of one commentator, the book does for the social benefits
side of government what the flat tax does for the revenue side.  It takes the
universe of government subsidy programs and transfer payments, cashes them
out, and hands them back again on the basis of per-citizen equality.   It then130
forbids the government from doing anything further.  Aside from the grant,
redistribution will come to a complete and permanent halt.
C.  Evaluation
Both books are well written, fast paced, and very good reads.  Graetz and
Shapiro tell an engrossing story, building toward a climax, with the rich detail,
attention to characterization, and suspense of a good detective tale.  Murray’s
book is short, a bare 127 pages long, equally well written and featuring what
must be one of the highest ideas-to-page ratios of any recent book.  Both
address vital social problems—progressive taxation, poverty, social mobility,
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the rising cost of entitlements, and the proper line between governmental and
individual responsibility—with imagination and flair.
Graetz and Shapiro’s book is the more descriptive of the two, Murray’s
the more prescriptive.  He has a program for America and wants his readers
to sign on to it.  It is tempting to find fault with the Murray book because of
its somewhat sweeping character.  For example, one wonders what provision
Murray would make for those who are too dim or short-sighted to put their
yearly grant to good use or run through it in the first month or two by partying
with their friends and buying luxury items.  Murray believes that many of his
fellow citizens are not very smart,  yet his new book seems to make little131
allowance for that weakness.
One is also tempted to ask why eliminating social programs would bring
human happiness, as Murray writes, when the most contented people seem to
live in European countries with high taxation, long vacations, and guaranteed
health care.   And what about this country’s very large jail population?132
Perhaps as a concession to his conservative constituents, Murray would
exempt prisoners from the $10,000-a-year grant,  but what, exactly, is an ex-133
felon to do when he gets out of prison only to find all the halfway houses, free
clinics, and government-operated job centers closed?
Still, the books constitute impressive efforts to address serious social
problems and should be on the shelf of every reader interested in this
country’s future.  Running through both of them, one issue looms large:
upward mobility.  Graetz and Shapiro want to provide for it by taxing the rich
for the benefit of the poor.  Their spirited defense of the estate tax is, in part,
an effort to reclaim upward mobility, and make the rich—who already have
enjoyed the fruits of it—pay for more of it for the rest of us.  They also worry
about the many citizens who voted for repeal because of an exaggerated view
of their chances for later-acquired wealth.  Believing that they would one day
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be effortlessly rich, they voted against a tax that would help them and their
class move slowly but surely ahead.
Murray embraces the opposite view.  For him, we already do too much
taking from the rich for the benefit of the poor.  Government spends our
money unwisely, discouraging individual initiative and free enterprise in the
process.  Getting government out of the redistribution business would return
responsibility to the right hands—the ones that earned the money in the first
place—and let each of us be the master of our own fate.
The differences between the two sets of authors, then, are partly
ideological and partly factual.  The ideological differences are largely a matter
of personal predilection.  This reviewer prefers Graetz-Shapiro’s approach,
but others might easily prefer Murray’s.  We can, however, investigate two
factual respects in which the two books differ.  One concerns the actual
amount of upward mobility in U.S. society, the second the current ideology
and mindset of empowered actors.
On the first issue, social science favors Graetz and Shapiro:  The world
of upward mobility is more like what they describe than what Murray
posits.   Few people change social class, and when they do the going is hard134
and their new foothold insecure.  But courts and many legislators ignore these
truths and side with Murray.   Ideologically, the current legal system is135
aligned with his libertarian view that upward mobility is wide open and the
role of government is to stay out of the way and let individuals rise or fall on
their merits.  Indeed, our system of law and politics is increasingly premised
on the myth of upward mobility, with troubling consequences.  As the gap
between the haves and the have-nots increases, might we one day need judges
and legislators uncommitted to unrealistic myths and ready to accept the
challenge of crafting institutions and case law that will enable talent, wherever
found, to emerge?
III.  UPWARD MOBILITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
American society, especially today, exhibits much less upward mobility
than most people think and certainly less than popular sources would suggest.
The extent to which poor individuals are able to work their way up the ladder
falls somewhere between the worlds of Graetz-Shapiro and Murray, but much
closer to the former.  Recent studies show that the United States has one of the
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lowest rates of upward mobility in the developed world and that few citizens
leave the class into which they are born for a higher one.   Downward136
mobility is just as common as the upward variety, particularly for African
Americans, but also for the middle class in general.   Eighty percent of an137
average citizen’s wealth is inherited, not created.138
One of the more arresting figures that emerges from studies of upward
mobility is that a person born in the lowest economic stratum has only about
a two percent chance of ending life anywhere near the top.   Poorly staffed139
and funded schools in poor and working-class neighborhoods, inadequate
prenatal nutrition and health care, environmental hazards and toxins, cutbacks
in affirmative action, downsizing, and relocation of industrial jobs away from
the inner cities are just some of the factors that weigh against a poor youth
seeking to better himself.   The military, for most, is a dead-end job (and not140
even open to those with a criminal record or poor health history), while our
country’s current obsession with incarceration and prison-building renders
even more young men and women unemployable every day.  Outsourcing, the
weakening of unions, and the loss of skilled jobs are additional hurdles.  Most
new jobs are in the “soft” low-wage, low-skill service sector.141
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston found that fewer families moved
from one quintile of the income ladder to a higher one during the 1980’s than
during the 1970’s, and that fewer still moved up in the 1990’s than the
1980’s.   A second, even larger study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics also142
found that mobility declined during the latter period.   Even though the143
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economic upturn of the late 1990’s lifted pay rates for low-income jobs such
as janitor and clerk, most occupants of those positions remained there—they
were still janitors and clerks at the end of the boom years.   Between 1973144
and 2000, the real income of the bottom 90 percent of American workers
actually fell by 7 percent.   (That of the top 1 percent rose by 148 percent,145
while that of the top 0.1 percent rose by 343 percent and of the top 0.01
percent by 599 percent. )  Although family income rose slightly during some146
of that period, much of the rise was due to the entry of wives into the paid
labor force and men working longer hours or at second jobs.   Inequality in147
the United States has risen to levels not seen since the Gilded Age of railroad
and steel robber barons, and exceeds that of Europe or Canada.   The Federal148
Reserve found that in a recent year, the richest one percent of U.S. households
controlled half of all of the nation’s financial assets.149
One recent study found that because of those sharp disparities, an
American child’s economic background is a better predictor of his or her
school performance than in Denmark, the Netherlands, or France.150
According to one scholar, “being born in the U.S. gives you a constellation of
privileges that very few . . . in the world have ever experienced.  Being born
poor in the U.S. gives you disadvantages unlike anything in Western Europe
and Japan and Canada.”   In the U.S., holding a college degree is a major151
determinant of who gets to enter middle class life.  But college is attainable
mostly by those whose families already have wealth or education.  Although
college enrollment has risen for higher-income students, most children from
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poor homes can only afford to go to community colleges, which in most cases
do not offer bachelor’s degrees.152
The number of students from very poor families who earn a college
degree was less than 5% in a recent year, a figure that has barely budged over
the last three decades.   The number from the bottom quarter who earned a153
degree was only 8.6 percent; from the top quarter, 74.9 percent.   Russ154
Douthat writing in the Atlantic Monthly notes that a child growing up in a
family earning over $90,000 a year has a 50 percent chance of earning a
college degree by age 24.   A child in a family earning $35,000 to $60,000155
has a 10 percent chance; and one in a family earning under $35,000 a 6
percent chance.   Part of the reason for low college completion is dropout:156
The relatively few students from low-income families who do enroll in a four-
year college often disenroll, for reasons ranging from poor preparation to not
having enough money to continue.   This poor record is not from lack of157
interest.  According to the N.Y. Times, 43 percent of those who did not
graduate from college considered a college degree essential to success; 32
percent of high school dropouts did, as well.158
At 250 of the most selective colleges, the proportion of students from
upper-income families has grown, not shrunk, in recent years.  The median
family income of a Harvard student is $150,000.   According to Princeton’s159
Educational Testing Service, only three percent of the freshmen at the top 146
colleges and universities come from the poorest quarter of American
families.   Competitive schools are beginning to use merit-based financial160
aid to attract talented students who might be tempted to enroll at one of their
competitor schools, rather than need-based financial aid that helps poor
students receive a college education.   Even the federal government, which161
has served as a traditional source of financial aid, is shifting resources from
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Pell grants, most of which go to families with incomes below $41,000, to
other forms of aid.162
In addition to inadequate educational opportunities, poor people are less
likely than their more fortunate counterparts to enjoy good health because of
environmental conditions such as pollution, toxic waste, lead paint, and
substandard nutrition.   They are also less apt to have access to basic health163
insurance and care, in part because the United States is the only developed
nation without some form of universal health insurance.   Upper-middle-164
class Americans live longer and are in better health than middle-class
Americans, who in turn live longer and are healthier than those at the
bottom.   Moreover, these class differences are widening, not closing.   The165 166
infant death rate for African Americans in Washington, D.C., is higher than
it is in Kerala, India.   Even overall, the U.S.’s statistics are poor.  The 2005167
Human Development Report pointed out that the infant mortality rate in the
U.S. was roughly equal to that of Malaysia.168
Data from the Internal Revenue Service show that those who file estate
tax returns have lived, on average, three years longer than the general
population.   In addition to living longer, the wealthy enjoy better health and169
vitality during their lives.  Americans who report that they are in excellent
health have 74 percent more wealth than those who report fair or poor health.
The reason is simple:  Both prevention and intervention are more widely
available to the affluent.   Poor health, of course, leads to low earnings, and170
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so on in a cycle.  Most people who have health insurance have it through their
jobs.  Those without jobs or who do temp work (the fastest-growing sector of
the economy) usually lack health insurance altogether.
As seen earlier, abolition of the estate tax will increase the tax burden on
the poor and middle class.   But that is not the only respect in which the tax171
system operates as a barrier to those groups.  Originally aimed at reducing
income disparities among citizens, the progressive income tax is starting to
vanish.  Most deductions today benefit those with wealth.  For example, a
taxpayer can deduct mortgage interest on two homes, which rewards those
with sufficient income to buy a second dwelling.  The deduction now covers
the mortgage interest on all types of homes—even a boat that serves as a
second home.  Home equity loans are just as deductible as mortgages, and the
proceeds of the loan need not go to home-buying; they may be used to
purchase a car or vacation while writing off the interest.172
In the 2004 presidential election, the Republican candidate insisted that
most of the latest tax cuts would go to the middle class.  In reality, 53 percent
will go to people with incomes in the top 10 percent.   More than 15 percent173
will go to just the top 0.1 percent, a small circle of about 145,000 taxpayers.174
The alternative minimum tax, created 37 years ago to assure that the very
richest paid taxes, has never been adjusted to take account of inflation, so that
families making between $75,000 and $200,000 annually pay thousands of
dollars in taxes that originally targeted only a few of the very wealthiest.  If
President Bush’s cuts become permanent, in a decade those making between
$100,000 and $200,000 will pay about 5 to 9 percent more in federal taxes
than those making over $1 million, and the gap will yawn even wider for those
further down the line.   Meanwhile, bankruptcy “reforms” have made it even175
harder for poor people to dig themselves out of debt and start anew.176
Unsurprisingly, their number is rising.  Poverty in the United States rose
from 11.7 percent in 2001 to 23.1 percent in 2002.   And, although the177
United States is one of the world’s richest countries, the United Nations
Development Programme reports that on its Human Poverty Index, which
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combines illiteracy, poverty, unemployment and life expectancy, Sweden
ranked first among developed nations and the United States last.   The U.S.178
also had the largest percentage of children (20.3 percent) living in poverty.179
Those children are not only poor for a longer period of time than in countries
like Germany, they are more likely to remain so when they grow up.   In the180
face of figures like these, an objective observer assessing the chances of a
typical poor child to enjoy any kind of serious upward mobility in life would
assess them as very low.
Upward mobility, especially for children of working-class parents, is so
unusual that those who do rise to positions such as university professor feel
like freaks.   They find themselves the only ones who do not know which181
fork to use at a faculty dinner party, how to sail, or what rich people do in
Monaco or Aix-en-Provence.  A recent spate of books and articles discuss how
isolated and insecure such people feel.   As the only one in their circle with182
working-class origins, they find few colleagues who understand their
background or the difficulty they feel in fitting in to their new settings.183
Despite this evidence, most Americans are optimistic about their chances
of getting ahead.  Forty percent believed that movement from one class to
another had improved over the last 30 years; in fact it has declined.   Even184
families earning less than $30,000 cling to the American dream, more than
half saying that they are either living it now or expect to do so soon.   Many185
of these are the same people who say they oppose the government’s taxing of
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a person’s estate at the time of his death.   Individuals who describe186
themselves as conservatives tend to say that mobility is wide open.  (Liberals
and progressives like Graetz and Shapiro are much more guarded.)  In a 1987
speech, Gary Becker, the University of Chicago economist who later won a
Nobel Prize for his studies of the welfare system, said that mobility in the
United States stood at such a high level that advantages passed on from
parents accounted for very little of a child’s life chances.   Subsequent187
investigation has refuted that judgment; most social scientists now say that the
early studies on which he based his statement were flawed, relying on
children’s fuzzy recollections of their parents’ incomes or misconstruing the
normal progress a person makes in his profession (for example, from young
associate in a law firm to partner) as upward mobility.188
If even a prominent economist can be wrong about the extent of upward
mobility, what about judges?  Courts are supposed to rely on evidence, not
hunches, country club gossip, or intuition.  What has been their role vis-à-vis
the myth of upward mobility?  Have they sifted and weighed the evidence, as
the reporters who compiled a massive New York Times study of upward
mobility, or a similar study reported in the Wall Street Journal, or a myriad of
recent social science articles and books (or, indeed, this review) have done?
Or have judges simply enshrined in their opinions the attitudes and beliefs of
members of their class?
IV.  THE OFFICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF UPWARD MOBILITY
In everyday parlance, a myth is a statement that is untrue yet believed by
a substantial segment of the population.  Study after study shows that class
membership in our society is relatively fixed, especially for those born into
poor families, who are racial minorities, or who lack a college education.189
Nevertheless a large portion of the population believes that the sky is the limit.
Conservatives, the wealthy, and tax reformers have a special investment in this
pleasant fable, which provides a justification for their good fortune at the
same time that it enables them to cast the blame on the rest of us for not
prospering as they have done.190
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What about courts, legislators, and other empowered actors?  Do they,
too, contribute to the myth of upward mobility?  As will be seen, they do so
with a regularity and a certitude even surpassing those found in the working
class or popular fiction.  But with governmental actors, a further irony
appears—at the same time that they celebrate the virtues of upward mobility,
they have been slamming the door shut on the real thing.
A.  Presidents, Legislators, and Other Public Figures
Presidents, legislators, and other public figures have praised upward
mobility lavishly, even as they were enacting measures that were sure to
curtail it.  For example, the Republican Party’s Contract with America
contains language extolling American values while laying out a blueprint for
reducing support for many of the services working and middle class people
need to get ahead in America.   Fourth of July speeches, Presidential191
addresses, and preambles to significant pieces of social legislation do the same
thing.  For example, the campaign to abolish the estate tax featured appeals to
middle income Americans and minorities based on the spurious claim that the
tax discouraged private enterprise and wealth-accumulation for folks like
them.192
When, a few years earlier, the Clinton administration acted to “end
welfare as we know it,” bipartisan supporters hailed the Personal
Responsibility Act (the Welfare Reform Act of 1996) as a measure to
strengthen individual initiative and encourage the idle poor to find work.193
In short, the administration touted a measure that made it more difficult for
single mothers to obtain emergency food and medical services and stay in
school as a means of getting them on their feet and into the job market.  This
reform’s early years seem to have brought few of the promised gains—indeed,
measured in terms of new and better jobs, healthier children, and school
completion, it seems to have been an unqualified failure.   These two194
programs (abolition of the estate tax and welfare reform) are illustrative of
developments across the board.  Even while reducing progressive taxation and
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funding for vital social programs, think-tank conservatives and public officials
have steadfastly maintained that what they were doing was necessary to spur
the economy and help people lift themselves by their bootstraps.195
B.  The Role of the Courts
The public speeches, private letters, and memoranda of judges,
particularly Supreme Court justices, are full of praise for the free enterprise
system and our wide-open society.  For example, Justice Clarence Thomas, in
a speech to the Federalist Society, rhapsodized at the way our political system
allows anyone with ambition and drive to get ahead:  “Success (as well as
failure) is the result of one’s own talents, morals, decisions, and actions,” he
said.  “Accepting personal responsibility for victory as well as for defeat is as
liberating and empowering as it is unpopular today.”196
And in an essay for the Cato Institute, Justice Antonin Scalia commended
our system’s historic openness and lamented that we have entered into “an age
in which many . . . believe that John D. Rockefeller, for all his piety . . . is
likely to be damned and Che Guevara, for all his nonbelief, is likely to be
among the elect.”197
Many of the Justices appear to think of their own careers as proof of the
reality of upward mobility, ignoring that most of them were successful lawyers
before ascending to the bench, and when confirmed to the Supreme Court
were simply following a natural course greased by political connections and
family influence.  Many have been wealthy graduates of top schools.  Yet,
their memoirs show that many of them think that their career paths illustrate
a Horatio Alger rags-to-riches story of obstacles overcome.   Perhaps this is198
why the Court generally denies any obligation on the part of government to
provide welfare, education, and housing services, while adamantly insisting
that the lack of them should make little difference.
In Lindsey v. Normet,  for example, the Supreme Court in 1972 found199
that despite “the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing . . . the
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Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic
ill.”   In holding that Oregon was not obliged to provide housing for the200
indigent, the Court wrote:  “We are unable to perceive in [the Constitution]
any . . . guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.”   The Court201
was apparently untroubled by the difficulty of achieving social mobility for
a person relegated to a neighborhood suffering from poor municipal services,
bad schools, crime, and dilapidated housing.  Indeed, in a dissenting opinion,
Justice William Douglas, perhaps noticing overtones in the opinion of Marie
Antoinette’s famous remark that sparked the French Revolution, wrote that the
Court’s “approach was appropriate in the feudal culture in which property law
evolved”  but was poorly fitted to today’s climate and needs.202
Only one year later, the ostensibly moderate Burger Court considered
whether the Equal Protection Clause required Texas to fund public education
on an equal basis.  The state had been raising revenues for school districts by
a scheme that relied, in part, on local property taxes so that schools in
property-rich districts were able to spend considerably more per pupil than
ones in districts with fewer taxable resources.  In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,  the Court held that wealth is not a suspect203
class, nor education a fundamental interest.   Thus, the Constitution, which204
does not require absolute equality or precisely equal services, did not compel
Texas to fund its schools even-handedly.  If any reform of Texas’s school
finance scheme were to come, the Court declared, it would have to come from
the legislature, not the courts.205
A dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall took the Court to task for
making a mockery of the nation’s commitment to equal educational
opportunity and for willfully ignoring the vital function it serves in enabling
upward mobility.  He wrote:  “In my judgment, the right of every American
to an equal start in life . . . is far too vital to permit state discrimination on
grounds so tenuous as those presented by this record.”206
Earlier sections of this Review Essay teach that Justice Marshall was right
and that without adequately funded schools and competent teachers, the
children of immigrants, minorities, and the poor will have little chance of
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becoming the next generation of Supreme Court Justices, or, indeed, of
qualifying for any high level job at all.207
Earlier, in Dandridge v. Williams,  the Court had found that state208
discretion over the disbursement of welfare (in this case, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children) and the resulting disparities among states and regions did
not contravene the Bill of Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment.   Maryland209
had set a cap on the amount of AFDC money a family could receive regardless
of its size so that large families suffered a penalty, namely less money per
child for such basic necessities as food and shelter.   While the Court210
recognized that welfare was one of the most basic needs of impoverished
human beings, economic and social policies receive little protection from the
United States Constitution.  Accordingly, the Court would not impose upon
the states its own view of how a welfare system should operate.   Like the211
two previously mentioned cases, Dandridge can be seen as refusing to endow
wealth with suspect-class status or to recognize the poor as a protected
class.212
In each of these cases, the Court characterized social and economic ills
as matters for legislative, not judicial treatment.  But the hope that Congress,
at least, would enact effective reforms in these areas has been vain.  That body
cut back on welfare in the Welfare Reform Act of 1996,  and when it turned213
to educational reform in the No Child Left Behind Act,  it provided for high-214
stakes testing, and few new resources for troubled schools.
At the same time, federal and state lawmakers have been narrowing the
few existing avenues of upward mobility by weakening remedies for
workplace discrimination,  tolerating a glass ceiling that limits the upward215
mobility of women,  and reducing the ability of individuals to secure the216
protections of bankruptcy at a time when the media encourage a culture of
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consumption that insures that more of them will find themselves in over their
heads.217
Current ads tout $130,000 Hummers and $600 jeans.  A New York Times
poll showed that fully 81 percent of Americans felt social pressure to buy
high-priced goods, whether they could afford them or not.   While some218
luxury goods, such as cell phones, have become more affordable over time,
the super-rich continue expanding the boundaries of desire to include personal
services such as chef, personal trainer, and nanny, and exotic vacations such
as space tourism and exclusive summer camps for their children.   This has219
led, in turn, to a “vertical desire” in which ordinary people covet the goods of
the rich and powerful as seen on TV.   Many splurge on expensive goods220
they cannot afford because of the availability of easy—but high-
priced—credit.  According to the Federal Reserve Board, Americans now owe
$750 billion in revolving debt, a six-fold increase from two decades ago.221
Living beyond one’s means can give the impression that one lives in a
classless society—no matter how lowly one’s job, no matter that one has no
idea how to finance one’s children’s college education, one can own some of
the things that rich people do.  One can easily begin to equate ownership of
a few luxury items with power over one’s fate, when in fact the opposite is
true—the more one owns, the less autonomy one enjoys and the greater the
chance that one will one day meet a stone wall.   Many Americans believe222
that they live in the best and freest society on earth.  But when asked what that
means, many say that they can shop at a range of stores for a variety of
goods.   Few mean voting, free speech, or a realistic chance to rise to a223
decision making position in society, for oneself or one’s children.224
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CONCLUSION:  NEEDED—A BETTER MYTH
Joseph Campbell and others have argued that a society’s myths say much
about it and are important ways it organizes its business.   With upward225
mobility, society needs a better myth.  The current one is
dysfunctional—individualistic, unrealistic, and prone to promise more than it
can deliver.  Descriptively, or even aspirationally, it lacks any mooring in our
current circumstances.
American society, and especially ordinary workers, would do better to
substitute a new narrative—that of working-class solidarity—for the current
version that does such mischief.  An emphasis on working class solidarity
would assure steady group progress and would include such aims as better
education, stronger unions, better occupational health and safety requirements,
a higher minimum wage, and a safety net of services, including health care, for
those who need them.  It would seek changes that would benefit everyone,
substituting genuine progress for mythical dreams or misnamed TV shows that
do not depict reality at all.
It would capture the teaching of Graetz and Shapiro that dreams do not
happen merely because we desire them, but require work, vigilance, and
resistance to false rhetoric.  The new myth would reject simplistic remedies
such as Murray’s flat-grant solution, substituting programs that rekindle hope,
inspire community, and do not dissipate our national treasure in trivial ways
that have little chance of making a lasting contribution to the fair and just
society that we aspire to be.
